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In what circumstances can an individual suppress through an injunction the dissemination of 
information identifying him as someone who has been arrested by the police, but not 
subsequently convicted of a criminal offence? This issue, considered by the Supreme Court in 
Khuja v Times Newspapers Limited (Khuja),
1
 unearths a tension between the long-standing 
principle of open justice, and the freedom of the press to report true and accurate information 
about the criminal justice system on one side, and privacy interests on the other. Where the 
matter leading to an arrest relates to allegations of the sexual abuse of children the effect on 
the privacy interests of the arrestee is likely to be particularly severe; putting the arrestee in a 
category of persons most loathed and feared by society.
2
 It is for this reason that the decision 
of the Supreme Court by a majority of 5-2, which fell decisively on the side of open justice 
and the freedom of the press, merits consideration. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In March 2012, the appellant, a prominent figure in the Oxford area, was arrested by Thames 
Valley Police along with nine other men in connection with a series of sexual offences 
against children. The arrests were made as part of “Operation Bullfinch”, which was 
launched by the police to address a pattern of crime involving the sexual exploitation of 
vulnerable girls by older men.
3
 The basis for the appellant’s arrest was that one of the 
complainants told the police that she had been abused by a man with the same first name 
(Tariq). However, after the complainant failed to select him in an identity parade, the 
appellant was told by the police that he was to be released without charge. Of the other nine 
men arrested, seven were convicted on 14 May 2013. At trial, the appellant was referred to by 
name on a number of occasions during the course of the complainant’s cross examination, 
and by a police officer giving evidence that the appellant had participated in the identity 
parade. The trial attracted national and local media attention, which was heightened by the 
perception that the victims of the men convicted had not been taken seriously by the police or 
child protection authorities.  
 
The appellant successfully sought an injunction under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court 
Act 1981, which prohibited the disclosure of any information that might identify him as the 
subject of pending criminal proceedings until he had been charged with a criminal offence. 
During the trial, the appellant successfully applied for another section 4(2) injunction to 
prohibit the publication of any report of evidence given at the trial which might identify him. 
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Three applications were made by the respondents (the Oxford Mail and The Times) to lift the 
section 4(2) orders. The first two were made by The Times towards the end of the trial, and 
were rejected. The third application, made jointly by both respondents after the trial, looked 
likely to succeed as the proceedings against the appellant could no longer be prejudiced by 
the publication of his personal information. Before a ruling was made, the appellant initiated 
proceedings in the High Court.  
 
On 22 October 2013, Tugendhat J, sitting in the High Court of Justice Queens Bench 
Division, dismissed the appellant’s application for an interim injunction restraining 
publication of his identifying particulars (name, photograph etc.) in relation to the criminal 
proceedings.
4
 The application was made on the basis that the injunction was necessary to 
protect the appellant’s right to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Tugendhat J held that any such rights were 
overridden when balanced against the public and the press’ rights to receive and impart 
information free from interference by a public authority under article 10 ECHR, and the 
principle of open justice protected under article 6 ECHR. The Court of Appeal (Lord Dyson 
MR, Sharp, and Vos LJJ) unanimously dismissed an appeal, concluding that as Tugendhat J 
had not erred in principle or reached a conclusion, which was manifestly wrong, it would not 
intervene.
5
  
 
2. The Majority Decision 
 
Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Clarke, and Lord Reed agreed) 
noted the value of the principle of open justice as “a guarantor of the quality of justice.”6 
Relying primarily on In re S (Identification: Restrictions on Publication),
7
 and In re 
Guardian News and Media Ltd,
8
 Lord Sumption ruled that it was not for the courts, save in 
the most compelling circumstances, to create by process of analogy further exceptions to the 
principle of open justice than are currently set out in statute.
9
 In so doing, his Lordship 
rejected the appellant’s argument that the judgment in A v British Broadcasting 
Corporation,
10
 where the Supreme Court rejected the BBC’s application to lift an injunction 
on the basis that to do so would violate the respondent’s rights under articles 2 and 3 ECHR, 
marked a change of approach. According to Lord Sumption, this decision turned on “very 
particular facts” and, therefore, did not undermine the general approach set out in previous 
authorities.
11
 
 
The appellant advanced a second argument that, in approaching the balancing exercise on the 
basis that the public will generally be able to distinguish between suspicion and guilt 
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(applying In re Guardian News and Media),
12
 Tugendhat J was committing an error of law by 
applying a legal presumption that was not warranted. Lord Sumption rejected this argument 
too, ruling that the Supreme Court in In re Guardian News and Media was not creating a 
legal presumption to be applied notwithstanding the circumstances. Rather, that Court (and 
Tugendhat J) were merely observing that, while some members of the public would equate 
suspicion with guilt, most would not. Consequently, Lord Sumption took the view that no 
error of law had been committed, Tugendhat J was entitled to reach the conclusion that he 
did.  
 
In approaching the balancing exercise on which the immediate case turned, Lord Sumption 
determined that the public interest served through press reportage of the criminal trial 
extended to the publication of the identifying particulars of the appellant as: “the anonymised 
reporting of issues of legitimate public concern are less likely to interest the public and 
therefore to provoke discussion.”13 Lord Sumption determined that the policy permitting 
media reporting was grounded in the right of the public to be informed about significant 
public acts of the state, and the law’s recognition that the way in which the story is presented 
is a matter of editorial judgment, in which the desire to increase the interest of the story by 
giving it a human face is a legitimate consideration.
14
 Against the backdrop of this weighty 
public interest, Lord Sumption did acknowledge that some members of the public might 
equate suspicion with guilt, and that there was risk that the appellant and his family may be 
subject to harassment or other unpleasant behaviour as a result. However, his Lordship 
determined that the appellant’s right to respect for his private life under article 8 was not 
engaged as he did not hold a reasonable expectation of privacy over matters that have been 
discussed at a public trial. Lord Sumption did accept that the appellant’s article 8 rights were 
engaged owing to the impact that publication may have on his family life (the second limb of 
article 8(1). Notwithstanding this concession, his Lordship characterised this impact as 
indirect and incidental, and ultimately of insufficient gravity to override the countervailing 
interests at stake.  
 
3. The Minority Decision 
 
Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson observed that if the correct approach to balancing the relevant 
ECHR rights was followed there would be no danger of an insidious erosion to the principle 
of open justice.
15
 The minority accepted the second argument put forward by the appellant 
that Tugendhat J took as a legal presumption that most members of the public will distinguish 
between suspicion and guilt, and, as a result, fell into error.  The minority also accepted that, 
if most members of the public did recognise this distinction, this would tip the balance in 
favour of the press and the public. Crucially, however, Lords Kerr and Wilson rejected the 
presumption, noting that no evidence had been adduced, in In re Guardian News and Media 
Ltd or subsequent cases applying the presumption, to support its use.  
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Citing the report of the Leveson Inquiry;
16
 a consultation response to a Law Commission 
paper on contempt of court;
17
 and the judgment of Cobb J in Rotherham Metropolitan 
Borough Council v M,
18
 Lords Kerr and Wilson noted increasing judicial and political 
concern about the effect upon an innocent person’s reputation of publication of the fact of his 
or her arrest. The minority also observed a “chasm” between the approach of the majority and 
the approach taken by Canadian courts in analogous cases,
19
 “which [the court] would be 
unwise to ignore.”20 The minority recognised that: “the naming of [the appellant] in the 
criminal trial creates a powerful extra dimension to the public interest in the proposed 
publications.”21 However, this was set against the circumstances in which the appellant came 
to be named in the trial, which largely surrounded a failure on behalf of the complainant to 
recognise him in identity parade. Lords Kerr and Wilson concluded that the balance fell in 
favour of the appellant’s article 8 rights:  
 
[A]gainst the public interest that the proposed piece about section 4(2) would be 
considerably more engaging and meaningful, this court needed first to recognise the 
risk to [the appellant] that his identification would generate a widespread belief not 
only that he was guilty of crimes which understandably attract an extreme degree of 
public outrage but also that he had so far evaded punishment for them; and then, in 
consequence, to balance the risk of profound harm to the reputational, social, 
emotional, and even physical aspects of his private and family life, notwithstanding that 
he is presumed by law to be innocent and has had no opportunity to address in public 
the offences of which at one time the police suspected him to be guilty.
22
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Those in doubt that the appellant might be subject to abuse or harassment upon the lifting of 
his injunction need only to type his name into the Twitter search bar on the day after the 
judgment was given. An Oxford Times article reporting on the judgment and identifying the 
appellant was circulated in a “tweet” from Tommy Robinson, former leader of the far-right 
political group, the English Defence League. This attracted comments from Twitter users that 
Khuja was a “scumbag”, as well as calls to “castrate the mongrel”, and “make his life 
miserable”. The story also gained national media attention.23 Whilst Lord Sumption 
acknowledged the risk that the appellant might be subject to similar treatment by some 
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members of the public as a consequence of publication, his Lordship ruled that the 
appellant’s right to respect to private life could not be engaged through such publication as he 
could not be said to hold a reasonable expectation of privacy over matters which had been 
discussed in open court. This line of reasoning, which focuses on current norms of privacy 
protection rather than on how a particular measure might set back the privacy related interests 
of the individual, is not surprising given that the Supreme Court has recently affirmed the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test as a mandatory precondition for the engagement of 
the private life limb of article 8.
24
 It is, however, regrettable; serving as another example of 
how domestic courts’ elevation of the test unduly narrows the scope of article 8 for those 
subject to a criminal process by cutting off an analysis of how such a process can impact 
upon the private life of the individual.
25
  
 
The minority engaged in a more holistic article 8 analysis, determining the weight of the 
appellant’s article 8 rights not only through reference to the impact that publication might 
have on his family, but also to the impact that publication would have on his reputation, and 
emotional and physical wellbeing. However, with an exclusive focus on what impact 
publication would have on the appellant and his family, even this analysis does not fully 
acknowledge the wider social utility that might be accrued through the protection of the 
appellant’s privacy. When privacy interests clash with other societal interests, such as free 
speech, they are often deemed to be of marginal importance, selfish, or anti-social.
26
 The 
extent to which the public interest can be served through privacy protection is often 
downplayed or ignored.
27
 Mead suggests that when free speech claims are used to legitimise 
privacy intrusions this can compromise our ability to form expansive social networks.
28
 The 
embarrassing or stigmatising nature of information, such as that which links an individual 
with child sex offences can, when disseminated, prevent him or her from developing new 
social relationships. This, according to Mead, is detrimental not only to the individual 
concerned, but also to society:  
 
The social benefit of A’s individual privacy in such a case is predicated on social 
identity being something that is not inscribed and static but socially contextualised and 
reflexively interactive. I learn about myself from my interactions with others. A learns 
to develop, to mature and to change following those interactions – as in turn does B… 
Thus, there is a shared interest in socialisation, something that a guarantee of limited 
release of information can help bring about.
29
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Understood in this broader sense, the trade off between privacy, on the one hand, and 
freedom of speech, on the other, is no longer one where the individual’s personal and 
possibly reprehensible desire to conceal aspects of his or her self is competing against the 
common welfare of all of society. Rather it becomes two aspects of the common good 
competing against one another. For privacy interests to be taken seriously, they must be 
recognised as being fundamentally important to society and not just the individual making the 
claim.
30
 
 
The appellant’s argument, that Tugendhat J made an error of law by applying a false 
presumption that the public will generally appreciate that the appellant was merely suspected 
of committing child sex offences, and not guilty of them, was a significant point of 
contention in the Supreme Court. The supposed presumption originates in the following 
comments from Lord Rodger in In re Guardian News and Media Ltd: 
 
In allowing [the publication of the identity of suspects], the law proceeds on the basis 
that most members of the public understand that, even when charged with an offence, 
you are innocent unless and until proved guilty in a court of law. That understanding 
can be expected to apply, a fortiori, if you are someone whom the prosecuting 
authorities are not even in a position to charge with an offence and bring to court.
31
  
 
The minority rightly observed that the statement “the law proceeds on the basis” suggests 
that, unless there is good reason not to do so, the courts should act on the basis that most 
people believe that someone arrested or charged with an offence is innocent until proven 
guilty. The proposition seems to have emerged unsupported by authority or evidence. As 
Lords Kerr and Wilson note: “Lord Rodger cited no authority for the proposition. Indeed, he 
referred to no evidence in support of it. No such evidence had been adduced in those 
proceedings.”32 The minority then cited a series of High Court authorities, and authorities 
from other jurisdictions to doubt the validity of the proposition. This compelling challenge to 
the notion that the public will generally recognise and accept the distinction between 
suspicion and guilt can be developed even further. In R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis,
33
 the Supreme Court held that the dissemination of non-conviction information 
(including allegations and arrest records) in the (admittedly, separate) context of an Enhanced 
Criminal Record Certificate would have a detrimental impact on the prospects of job 
applicants pursuing their chosen career. In holding that such a practice engaged article 8(1) 
ECHR, Lord Neuberger (who, notably, was in the majority in Khuja) observed that the 
disclosure of any such non-conviction information held on police records would likely 
“represent something close to a killer blow” to the hopes of a job applicant.34 If it were true 
that all but an unreasonable minority of the public would not take such arrests or allegations 
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as an indicator of guilt then it is difficult to see why the disclosure of mere suspicions in the 
context of criminal records checking would have this kind of detrimental impact.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In Khuja, the Supreme Court was faced with an unenviable balancing exercise. The majority 
recognised that the respondents, in seeking to publish the appellant’s identifying particulars, 
were serving a social function of fundamental importance by upholding the principle of open 
justice. However, in determining the “weight” that should be attributed to the appellant’s 
private life, the majority did not, at least in their articulated reasoning, give sufficient weight 
to the important social functions served through privacy protections, and the detrimental 
impact that publication would inevitably have upon the private life of the appellant. Without 
a full recognition of the impact of publication on the appellant’s private life, the Supreme 
Court could not hope to strike a fair balance between the competing fundamental rights at 
stake in this case.     
 
